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I. Update on the status of the project and current negotiations




compensation to be paid by Puna to NELHA for s~eam
Review of Puna proposal
Methods of determining the value of steam
a. Other steam sale contracts
b. Steam valuation for royalty calculations
c. Cost alternatives to Puna
d. Trade off of price and restrictions
III. Puna's desired option to drill additional wells
1. NELHA reservation of rights
2. Benefits to additional drilling
IV. Operation and maintenance of the HGP-A well and site
1. Reasons to be the operator
2. Reasons for Puna to be the operator
V. Other issues
Review of
Proposed Steam Sales Agreement
between
Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority
and
Puna Geothermal Venture
I have reviewed the proposed Steam Sales Agreement between the
Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority ("NELHA") and Puna
Geothermal Venture ("Puna") (the "Agreement"). Set forth below are
my comments, questions anu discussion points. Except as defined
herein, capitalized terms are those defined in the Agreement.
1. Recitals
The recitals will need to be modified to reflect the agreed
upon terms of the transaction.
2. Paragraph 1 - Purchaser of Steam from Seller's Existing Well~
This provision allows Puna to use the Well as they choose, or
not to use the Well at all. Allow~ng Puna to use the Well in this
manner, creates an obvious economic issue for NELHA. The less the
Well is used, the less steam is produced and the lower the revenues
to NELHA. In addition, allowing this type of well usage potentially
creates a technical issue. If the Well is used intermittently, the
cycling process can be damaging to the Well.
It is not unreasonable for a developer to want maximum
flexibility to operate the steam field in the most efficient anu
economic means possible. However, it is also not unreasonable for
the resource owner to want its steam used on a priority basis for
both economic and technical reasons.
Puna has effectively set forth a possible means of resolving
these issues by offering a Well Availability Fee and a minimum
Steam Fee. This method of compensation, if appropriately priced,
can eliminate economic impact of any reduced Well usage. It also
establishes an economic incentive for Puna to use the Well, since
it must pay regardless of usage. Economic incentive is probably
the best method of assuring the Well will be used in a consistent
manner. Attempting to mandate well usage in the Agreement can be
difficult. Puna should clarify its intended use of the Well and
state the intended use in the Agreement.
The issue of whether the proposed compensation to NELHA for
use of the Well is adequate is discussed in Comment 4.
Does the Well have a history of problems when it is cycled?
Are there any issues regarding the quality of the steam (non-
condensible gasses or impurities) that would affect Puna's desire
to use the Well relative to other wells?
3. Paragraph 2 - Delivery of Steam.
" ... then Buyer shall make such improvements at Buyer's
expense, or Buyer may have the option of making such improvements
as Seller's contractor." These concepts appear to contradict each
other. Puna will need to clarify.
It is not unreasonable for Puna to want the right to exercise
some control over the entire steam field system, particularly in
matters of safety to field personnel or plant equipment. However,
the extent of the control should be determined by, among other
things, who pays for necessary improvements. It's clear in
Paragraph 3(b) that Puna expects NELHA to pay for maintaining the
Well regardless of the operator. If NELHA is paying for
improvements, it should have significant input in deciding how and
where money is to be spent.
4. Paragraphs 3 & 4 Consideration for Exclusive Purchase.
Agreement; Well Availability Fee; Steam Fee.
While the Agreement is being called a steam sales agreement,
the compensation structure proposed by Puna is, in many ways, more
characteristic of a well acquisi.tion and mineral lease. If viewed
in this manner, the
To help decide the appropriateness of the compensation being
proposed by Puna, below is a calculation converting the total
proposed compensation to an annual compensation, and then comparing
that amount to various methods used in the geothermal industry for
determining steam value.
Puna is proposing to compensate NELHA for use of the Well (See
1 below) by paying the following amounts:
Annual
Compensation
* One time fee $ 250,000
* Well Availability Fee (Annua
* Steam Fee
Based on actual s of steam
delivered at a pric of $ 0.11415
per 1000 pounds, wi a minimum






(1) For purposes of evaluating Puna's proposed compensation,
it is assumed that the payments relate only to the steam taken from
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the Well. See Comment 6 regarding Puna drilling additional wells
on the property.
(2) For purposes of calculating annual compensation, it is
assumed that the $250,000 fee paid at the time of signing the
Agreement is amortized over a ten-year period.
(3) Assumes the Well is produced at full capacity, estimated
to be 60,000 pounds per hou r., The Steam Fee per year would be
approximately $ 60,000. Th~~amount is calculated as 6~,000 pounds
x 24 hours x 365 days x$ 0.11415/1000 pounds per hout.
Other Steam Sale Contracts
In the Geysers area of Northern California, the world's
largest producing steam field, some steam producers are paid for
their steam based on the number of pounds of steam delivered to the
plant. This method of payment is similar to Puna's proposed Steam
Fee. The price paid for steam in the Geysers is reported to be
between $1.60 and $1.80 per thousand pounds per hour. The
developers are responsible for drilling the wells, delivering the
steam to the plant and all steam field operating and maintenance
costs.
Assuming a 60,000 pound well and a contract price for steam
of $1.70 per thousand pounds per hour, annual compensation for the
steam would be approximately $ 893,500. This amount is calculated
as 60,000 x 24 hours x 365 days x $1.70/1000 pounds per hour. This
amount is considerably higher than the amount being proposed by
Puna. To make the analysis comparable, one should consider that the
capital costs of drilling and constructing gathering systems and
the maintenance costs in the Geysers may be higher than in Hawaii,
and therefore, require a higher price.
Steam Valuation for Royalties
When steam is sold from one party to another on an arm's
length basis, the amount paid for the steam clearly establishes the
value of the steam. This value is the basis for calculating
royalties due to surface and mineral owners. Many developers are
now producing steam for consumption by their own power plants.
Electricity, not steam, is the end product. Because these projects
do not sell steam, an alternate method of establishing: the value
of the steam required to calculate royalties. t4any of these
projects, inclUding all projects on Federal leases, are using an
allocation of revenue method to determine the steam value. Under
this method, a negotiated percentage of the electricity revenues
is allocated to the value of the steam. This percentage ranges from
as low as 35% to as high as 50%.
Let's assume that the Puna project sells 25,000 Kwh of
electricity 90% of the time, at an energy price of six cents per
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Kwh, and that the Well represents 10% of the steam field (2.5Mw).
If the steam is valued at 42% of the revenue, the value of the
steam would be approximately S 497,000 per year. This amount is
calculated as 25,000 Kwh x .90 capacity factor x 24 hours x 365
aays x S 0.6 electricity sales price x 42% attributable to steam
value x 10% attributable to the Well. This method of valuation also
creates a steam value considerably higher than the Puna proposal.
Another means of determining the value of the Well, at least
the value of the Well to Puna, is to calculate the cost to Puna of
obtaining steam from another source. In this case, the only other
available source would be to drill an addi tional well on their
existing leases.
I don't have the data to calculate this cost. However, it's
fair to say that a new well would cost substantially more than the
up front fee being offered to NELHA. In addition, drilling involves
risk. Further, if Puna was to drill an addition well, it would have
the on-going cost of royalties to the surface and mineral owners.
Assuming the royalties are 10% of the value of the steam, the
royalties, based on the assumptions used above, would be nearly
S 50,000 per year. This is calculated as a 10% royalty x S 497,000
value of steam.
Specific comments
The Well Availability Fee compensates NELHA for maintaining
and making the Well available. It is proposed that the first
payment be made on the anniversary date of the Agreement and
annually thereafter.
addition, the Well
ee s ould cont nue to be paid for the term of the
Agreement, not "for as long as Buyer continues to purchase Steam
delivered by the Seller from the Well" as proposed. This would
require that Puna continue to pay the Well Availability Fee or
terminate the Agreement in the event the Well is shut down for any
period of time. It does, however, appear that if steam is produced
for even one day during the year, the fee is due for the entire
year.
proposed that the Steam Fee be paid quarterly.
The Well and the Site are subject to the terms and conditions
of a geothermal resource lease with the State of Hawaii (the
"Geothermal Lease"). The Geothermal Lease provides for royalties
to be calculated at 10% of the gross amount or value of the
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geothermal resources. The Geothermal Lease further provides for
the State to waive the royal ties for the term of the lease, but
does require a calculati,on be made of the amount of the royalties.
Are these calculations being made? What method is being used to
calculate the royalties? How is the value of the steam being
determined?
A final thought on compensation. In my opinion, the more
flexibility that Puna receives with respect to the use of the Well,
the Site and the resource, the more they should be willing to pay.
Similarly, the more restrictive the terms of the Agreement as to
the usage of the Well, the Site and the resource, the less Puna
should be expected to pay.
5. Paragraph 5 - Seller's Reservation of Steam Use.
If NELHA desires to reserve the right to use the Steam for its
research facilities, than this provision needs to be a direct
statement that "the Buyer reserves the right to use the Steam," not
that "the parties will cooperate in providing Steam."
Further, the reservation of rights should not be subject to
the facilities being "(i) technically and economically feasible,
and (ii) not prohibited by permits issued to either the Buyer or
the Seller." These qualifications provide obstacles for NELHA to
use the Well. Who determines what is technically and economically
feasible? What is included in making that determination? Will
Puna's economics be considered in the decision as to what is
economic?
As to the qualifications regarding permits! Puna should
clarify the purpose of this provision. Do any of Puna's development
permits require demonstration of adequate reserves and/or
del i verabili ty or require maintenance of minimum levels of reserves
and/or deliverability? If so, does Puna intend to include the Well
and related reserves in these calculations? If they do, it would
make it difficult to remove the Well from their use in the future
without violating the terms of the permit.
The reservation OL rights provision also should include
NELHA's right to plug and abandon the Well, if in the sole
discretion of NELHA and without liability to Puna, it is not
productive/profitable to NELHA to continue the operation of the
Well.
6. Paragraph 6 - Option for Additional Wells.
The Agreement gives Puna the option to drill additional wells
on the property. Whether NELHA chooses to grant this option is a
business decision that will have to be made. However, it should be
considered that it may be better to have a well with a bottom hole
on the NELHA property, which allows NELHA to be compensated for its
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steam, than to have a well just off the property that arguably
causes the steam to migrate from the property to the neighboring
well. NELHA doesn't get paid for steam in that situation.
In any event, it would not be appropriate to grant Puna the
option to drill injection wells on the property, when the Agreement
does not provide for NELHA to be compensated for the use of such
a well.
As a practical matter, because of the small size of the Site,
it may not be reasonable that additional wells would be located on
or under the Site. The effects of drilling any additional
the property should be discussed wi th NELHA' s reservoir consultant.
This provision does not address NELHA's reservation of rights
to use steam from the property. Would the new wells be available
for use by NELHA? The provision also lacks standard language
prohibiting new drilling from interfering with existing operations.
For what period of time would Puna have the option to drill?
If Puna is to have the right to drill additional wells and/or
be the operator of the Well or the Site (See Comment 8),
consideration should be given to having Puna agree to be subject
to the terms and conditions of the Geothermal Lease. The intent
would not be to assign or sublease NELHA' s ri9hts under t.he
Geothermal Lease, but to make Puna responsible for certain of the
operating obligations of the leCi.se.
7. Paragraph 7.1 - Waste.
It seems reasonable that the NELHA would be responsible for
injecting the steam it uses for its operations.
8. Paragraph 7.3 - Opera~ion and Maintenance.
This section clearly defines Puna as the operator of the Well,
with NELHA to be responsible for the costs incurred by
operator. Whether Puna is to be the operator of the \iell is a
business decision to be made by NELHA. It's not unreasonable for
Puna to want to be the operator, in that having a single operator
for all the wells provides maximum efficiency in the operations.
This provision does not define the Puna affiliate that would
do the work on the Well. I assume Puna wou Ld not be the actual
field operator of the project. The provision also does not define
any authorization process for the expenditure of funds and does not
define how the operator would be compensated. Any operator or
entity with access to the Site needs to have adequate insurance.
These issues are mute, if NELHA decides to be the operator.
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Does NELHA have operators available? Is it cost effective for
NELHA to operate the Well?
Does NELHA want technical data about the Well or the reservoir
produced by Puna? This can be a negotiating point.
9. Paragraph 7.4 - Obligations to be Without Recourse to Buyer.
The concept of limiting liability to the project entities is
common in this type of transaction. However, it's not clear what
the term "look solely to the Plant(s)" means. Is the Plant(s) an
entity? Does it include the owner's interest in the steam field,
the permits, accounts receivable?
provision should be reviewed by legal counsel.
10. Paragraph 8.1 - Adequacy of Resource.
11. Paragraph 8.2 - Permits.
This provision requires Seller "to cooperate with the Buyer"
regarding permits, but does not designate the entity to pay the
cost of such cooperation. What does cooperate mean? Does it require
attendance at hearings, filing reports or testifying before
regulatory groups? This needs to be clarified.
12. Paragraph 9 - No Rights Retained.
13. Paragraph 10(a) - Term.
It is not unreasonable for Puna to want to have a long-term
claim on the steam. The certainty of resource availab1li ty is
necessary to satisfy lenders and permits. A more standard provision
would be for the Agreement to run for term of the electricity sales
contract or so long as the buyer continues to run the plant and use
the Well. If Puna does not operate the Well for some defined period
of time, NELHA should have the option to terminate the Agreement.
The Agreement with Puna should not extend beyond the
term of the Geothermal Lease without the agreement of the State.
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14. Paragraph 10(b) - Term.
Puna needs to clarify the idea of a "material default." Sixty
days is a long cure or commence to cure period, but is not
unreasonable for non-monetary defaults. NELHA may want a shorter
period to cure for a payment or monetary default. It's not clear
what is added by (ii), since Paragraph 10(a) provides for
termination with 60 days notice. Puna should clarify the need for
( i i) .
15. Paragraph 12 - Environmental Indemnity.
16. Paragraph 16 - Force Majeure.
It doesn't seem to me that the Agreement, as written, provides
for the type obligations that would be affected by force majeure.
The effect of this provision should be considered if NELHA proposes




















One time fee of $ 250,000
amortized over 1° years $ 25,000
Well Availability Fee 50,000
Steam Fee based on 60,000
pounds per hour of steam
at the proposed price of
$ .11415 per 1000 pounds( 1) 90,000
$135,000
(1) 60,000 pounds x 24 hours x 365 days
x $ .11415/ 1000 price of steam
Steam Sale Cont acts
Method of Payment
$ per 1000 pounds per hour
of steam delivered
Range of Prices in the Geysers
$ 1.60 - $ 1.80 per 1000 pounds per hour
Annual Revenue from a 60,000 Pound Well
$ 1.60 - $ 840,960
$ 1.70 - $ 893,520
$ 1.80 - $ 946,080
(60,000 pounds x 24 hours x 365 days
x $ 1.60 per 1000 pounds per hour II
$ 840,960 )
Steam luation for R yalties
Method of Calculation
Allocation of electricity revenues
Range of Percentages Allocated to
Steam Value
35% - 500/0
Annual Revenue from a 60,000 Pound Well
350/0 - $ 414,000
42% - $ 497,000
500/0 - $ 591,000
( 25 Mw plant x 900/0 availability x 24
hours x 365 days x $ .06 per Kwh price
for electricity x 350/0 allocated to
steam value x 100/0 allocated to 60,000
pound well = $ 414,000 )
